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Abstract- The formal study of human error is relatively recent, especially in medical domain, and is 
tied closely to a several other relatively new fields. Organizational root cause of human error is less 
considered. Despite growing social, industrial and scientific interest in the organizational causes of 
incidents, the concept of organizational failure and related tools are still less considered in many 
developing countries e.g. Iran. Also, there is few incident record-keeping in medical domain on human 
error. Therefore, this study draws on case study research to investigate the applicability of a European 
taxonomy of organizational failure in Iran, in aviation domain with a fair incident record-keeping. This 
case study resulted in 10 incident in-depth descriptions, which occurred during one year in a part of 
civil aviation due to operator error. Within each case study, an explanation building method is used to 
develop a tool for classifying organizational root causes. Results include 100 root causes. The 
distribution of organizational root causes over the main categories of the former taxonomy shows a 
need to add a new sub-category to improve its applicability in Iran. The new sub-category is related to 
culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The past decade has seen that the problem of 
medical error come to light. It is estimated that 
98,000 deaths per year occurring in the US hospital 
system are attributable to medical error. Medical 
errors are the 5th cause of death in the US, and cost 
$24 billion annually (1). There is growing 
recognition that it is more due to errors and incidents 
(i.e. accidents and near misses) than blaming the 
person involved (2).  
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Reason (1991) clearly shows a change in scope in 
incident investigation, which is at any time 
determined to a large extent by the kind of 
preventive measures preferred. In current incident 
investigation, it is common to subdivide the causes 
that lead to an incident into the following three 
groups of failure: technical, human and 
organizational failure (3). Risk management is 
receiving interest from researchers in industrial 
engineering, management sciences, psychology and 
human factors in both developed and developing 
countries.  
Despite growing social, industrial and scientific 
interest in the organizational causes of incidents, the 
concept of organizational failure and related tools 
are still less considered in many developing 
Organizational failure root 
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countries e.g. Iran. To cope with the increasing 
demand for risk management methods and tools in 
this area, this article will discuss the application of a 
taxonomy of organizational failures, which is 
originally developed in Europe, in Iran. Therefore, a 
basis for analyzing of organizational causes of 
safety-related incidents will be provided. The initial 
taxonomy was presented by Vuuren (1999) and was 
followed both by a top-down (theoretical path) and a 
bottom-up (empirical path) approach. The study was 
carried out by six cases in two different domains; the 
Dutch steel industry (coke producing and steel 
production plant); and the medical domain (both in 
England   and  The  Netherlands,  including  accident  
and emergency, anesthesia, intensive care unit, and 
care of the mentally handicapped). This taxonomy is 
presented in Table 1. 
Despite maximum variety domain in Vuuren 
study, additional exploratory research may need to 
ensure transferability of this taxonomy to developing 
countries. The initial intention of this research was to 
study human error induced by organizational failure 
in medical domain in Iran. Due to lack of incident 
record keeping, it shifted to civil aviation. Formal 
incident investigation and record keeping, high-
technology work environment and the importance of 
human error in aviation persuaded the authors to 
work in this domain for the first attempt.   
 
 
Table 1. The taxonomy of organizational causes of safety related incidents, developed by Vuuren (3) 
Main categories Subcategories Definitions 
Task demands OS1 Refers to failures related to the wrong fit between 
the capabilities of the worker and the demands of 
the job. 
Responsibilities 
 
OS2 Refers to failures related to the absence or 
inaccurate allocation of responsibilities among 
departments, groups and persons. 
Skills and knowledge OS3 Refers to failures resulting from inadequate 
measures taken to ensure that situational or domain 
specific skills and knowledge are transferred to all 
new or inexperienced staff. 
Working procedures OS4 Refers to failures related to the quality and 
availability of the working procedures within the 
department (too complicated, inaccurate, 
unrealistic, absent, poorly presented). 
Structure  
Supervision 
 
OS5 
 
Refers to failures related to the absence of 
supervision on work with increased risks. 
Strategy and goals 
 
Management priorities OG1 Refers to failures resulting from management 
decisions in which safety is relegated to an inferior 
position when faced with conflicting demands or 
objectives. 
Norms and rules for dealing 
with risks 
OC1 Refers to failures resulting from the absence of 
explicit or tacit norms and rules for dealing with 
risks. 
Safety attitudes 
 
OC2 Refers to failures related to the collective beliefs 
about risks and the importance of safety, together 
with the motivation to act on those beliefs. 
Culture  
 
Reflexivity on safety 
practice 
OC3 Refers to failures related to an inadequate learning 
of the organization from its own safety 
experiences.  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
This paper draws on case study method well-
defined by Yin. Case study is a kind of non-
statistical methodology, which has been widely used 
in social sciences for more than a century. Applying 
this methodology, however, in other fields is 
relatively new (4). According to Yin, a fatal flaw in 
doing case studies is to conceive statistical 
generalization as the method of generalizing the 
results of a case. In statistical generalization, an 
inference is made about a population on the basis of 
empirical data collected about a sample. However, 
cases are not sampling units and should not be 
chosen for this reason. Rather, individual cases are to 
be selected as a laboratory investigator selects the 
topic of a new experiment. Multiple case studies 
should be considered like multiple experiments. 
Under these circumstances, the method is analytic 
generalization, in which a previously developed 
theory or taxonomy is used as a template with which 
to compare the empirical results of the case study. 
Within each case study, a similar iterative nature 
of ‘explanation building’ is used to develop a tool 
for classifying organizational root causes. This 
approach results in the following steps to be carried 
out: 
• Make an initial tool for classifying 
organizational root causes of safety related incidents;  
• compare the findings of an initial incident 
against this tool; 
• revise the tool; 
• compare the revision to the findings of the 
second, third or more incidents; and repeat this 
process as often as needed. 
It is not the main goal of this study to gain insight 
into the relative importance of the individual 
organizational failure factors. Implementing 
corrective action was not part of the project. 
This study investigates 10 incidents which 
occurred during one year in a part of civil aviation 
due to operator error. Two sources of information 
were used. The first is formal reports of each 
incidents investigation. The investigations were 
performed by a committee of experienced members 
in that organization. The second source includes 
interviews with those who were involved in the 
incidents and were blamed by the Committee.  
Interviews were conducted according to Critical 
Incident Technique developed by Flanagan (1945). 
This technique was originally developed to identify 
critical job requirements including those which have 
been demonstrated to make the difference between 
success and failure in carrying out an important part 
of the job assigned in a significant number of 
instances. To obtain valid information regarding 
critical requirements for success, procedures were 
developed for making a systematic analysis of 
causes of good and poor performance (2). A series of 
questions suggested by Dekker (5) were used for 
interview.  
Methods of triangulation involved looking for 
consistency across the entire data set; comparing 
data collected from the initial interviews with data 
collected from observations and interviews of 
instructors and trainees interviewed on multiple 
occasions; and comparing data from interviews, 
observations and secondary sources. Triangulation of 
sources was achieved by checking for consistency in 
what respondents said over time in multiple 
interviews. Triangulation through multiple analysts 
was obtained by inviting those studied to review the 
findings (6). 
 
RESULTS 
 
This case study resulted in 10 incident in-depth 
descriptions, containing 100 root causes. The 
distribution of the root causes over the main 
categories of Vuuren taxonomy are shown in Table 
2. The unclassifiable root causes include human 
error (skill-based and rule-based) or root causes 
related to situations that operators complain about a 
non work-related stress. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of all root causes over main categories of Vuuren taxonomy 
Total 
Organizational/ 
Unclassifiable 
Unidentified 
Non-
organizational 
Culture 
Strategy and 
goals 
Structure  
100 8 15 6 42 16 13 No. of  root causes 
Organizational failure root 
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Table 3. Distribution of organizational root causes over main categories of Vuuren taxonomy 
Total Organizational/Unclassifiable Culture  Strategy and goals Structure  
79 8 42 16 13 No. of  root causes 
100 %10 %53  %20  %17 Percentage 
 
 
Since this study focused on organizational 
failure, other root causes were omitted. The 
distribution of organizational root causes over the 
main categories of Vuuren taxonomy are shown in 
Table 3. Table 3 shows the main categories of 
Vuuren taxonomy well covered the organizational 
failures in this study. Only 10% (8 root causes) can 
not be classifiable by it. All of these organizational-
unclassifiable root causes were related to culture. 
Therefore, a new sub-category is added. It is national 
culture (OC4) and refers to failures resulting from an 
insufficient recognition by the organization of the 
effects of country specific norms or values on 
behavior. In this study OC4 manifested in situations 
such as excessive corporation or sensitivity to 
respect older people. During interviews, the 
interviews, themselves, referred to these kinds of 
behaviors as “reserved culture” of eastern countries.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, a step is made towards a better 
understanding of organizational failure. Findings of 
this study show influence of national culture on 
safety culture. According to Gibson and 
ZellmerBruhn (2001) individuals bring cultures of 
origin to work that reflect their particular ongoing 
histories in various cultural contexts, such as 
national culture. Cross-cultural research has 
established that national culture explains between 
some degrees of variation of social behavior such as 
aggression, conflict resolution, social distance, 
helping, dominance, conformity and obedience (7). 
As Hofstede showed, ranking of individuality (IDV) 
for Iran is at 41. The low ranking on this dimension 
indicates the society is collectivist as compared to 
individualist. This is manifested in a close long-term 
commitment to the member ‘group’, is that a family, 
extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty 
in a collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides 
most other societal rules and regulations (8).  
This paper shows that national culture can be a 
source of non-adherence to procedure. Therefore, it 
is necessary for organizations such as hospitals and 
health care system to consider specific national 
culture to improve their safety culture. Cultures can 
enhance learning, though they may also sustain 
existing patterns of belief and thereby learning to 
conformity, or non learning (6). However, 
organizational and national cultures are not simply 
parallel construct at two levels of analysis; rather, 
they have distinct contents and influences (7). This 
study provided a basis for analyzing of 
organizational causes of safety related incidents 
which can be applied to medical domain. However, 
further research is needed to take up this exploratory 
study and move on to a full understanding of 
organizational failure effects on human error. Given 
the results of this study, it is concluded that 
additional exploratory research is not likely to 
provide new insights. Different research designs are 
needed in order to be able to explain and test the 
impact of organizational failure factors on human 
error.  
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